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While Ms. Skollingsberg was watching Mr. Barber, his eight
and ten year old sons went off in different directions and later
rejoined their father.

When the boys returned to their father they

were carrying a large white plastic Z.C.M.I. bag (R. 131). Mr.
Barber then took the white plastic bag and placed the Cabbage Patch
doll and the brown plastic bag in the Z.C.M.I, bag and returned it
to his youngest son (R. 132). The two boys then left their father
(R. 132).
Ms. Skollingsberg called for assistance in helping her
watch Mr. Barber (R. 133). Another Z.C.M.I. employee, Mrs. Hansen,
came up to the third floor to assist Ms. Skollingsberg (R. 162).
When Mrs. Hansen found that her assistance was not required she got
on the escalator to return to the second floor.

Mr. Barber and his

sons also got on the escalator behind Mrs. Hansen.

Mrs. Hansen

testified that while taking the escalator down to the second floor
she overheard Mr. Barber tell his son to take what he had and ditch
it in the toy department (R. 168).
Mr. Barber and his two sons again separated and only the
older son returned (R. 152). Mrs. Hansen then went to the toy
department to see if she could find the younger son.

Mrs. Hansen

observed the boy and asked Mr. Hutchinson, a husband of a Z.C.M.I.
employee, to follow the boy (R. 164).
Mr. Hutchinson followed the boy outside the store to the
parking terrace.

Mr. Hutchinson then approached the boy and told

him that he thought they should return to the store (R. 193). Mr.
Hutchinson, over objection by defense counsel, testified that the

- 2 -

boy said, "I didn't want to do this.
201).

My Dad made me do this" (R.

The Court overruled the objection ruling that the statement

was not hearsay pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence, §801(d)(2)(D)
(1983).
Ms. Skollingsberg testified that she never lost sight of
Mr. Barber (R. 145). David Bailey, another employee testified that
five minutes before Mr. Barber was apprehended, Mr. Barber had
notified Mr. Bailey that his son had taken something from his
department (R. 171). Mr. Bailey then noticed that a video camera
and recorder were missing.
As Mr. Hutchinson was bringing the younger son back into
the store Mr. Barber and the older son left the store.

Mr. Barber

and his sons then returned to the store with Mr. Hutchinson and the
Z.C.M.I. employees.

Mr. Barber then told the store employees that

his younger son must have taken the doll and returned the doll to
its display (R. 137).
Mr. Barber was escorted to the security office with his
sons.

The younger son told Ms. Skollingsberg about the video camera

and recorder.

The boy took Ms. Skollingsberg to the toy department

and retrieved the video recorder from under a display (R. 139). The
boy also told Ms. Skollingsberg that the video camera was outside in
the car (R. 140).
Mr. Barber gave his keys to a sheriff's deputy who had
arrived and arrested him (R. 183). The deputy found the video
camera in a brown plastic bag on the front passenger seat of Mr.
Barber's car (R. 185).
At trial Mr. Bailey testified that the video camera and
recorder sold together for over one thousand dollars, but that it
- 3 -

was not possible to determine a price for the camera alone (R.
181).

The State presented no evidence as to the value of the camera

alone.

Ms. Skollingsberg testified that the Cabbage Patch Doll sold

for thirty six dollars (R. 137).
At the close of the State's case defense counsel moved to
dismiss for insufficient evidence or to amend the Information to
reflect the fact that the only item linked to Mr. Barber was the
thirty six dollar Cabbage Patch doll (R. 206, 207). The motions
were denied.
The jury found Mr. Barber guilty of Retail Theft, a second
degree felony.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The first argument presented on appeal involves the trial
court's error in admitting into evidence a statement made by Mr.
Barber's son.

The statement was hearsay and did not come under the

agency exception that the trial court used in admitting the
statement.
The second argument is that insufficient evidence was
presented to convict Mr. Barber of Retail Theft.

The evidence did

not show that Mr. Barber encouraged his sons to take the items or
was otherwise criminally responsible for their actions.
Finally/ Mr. Barber contends that the State did not prove
that the retail value of the items taken exceeded one thousand
dollars.

- 4 -

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
HEARSAY TESTIMONY
At trial, the State sought to introduce into evidence a
statement allegedly made by Mr. Barber's eight year old son that "I
didn't want to do this.

My Dad made me do this" (R 201).

Defense

counsel objected to the admission of such statement on the grounds
that it was inadmissible hearsay (R 194-201).

The trial court

admitted the statement, ruling that it was not hearsay pursuant to
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) (R 199-200).
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."
The state introduced the statement allegedly made by Mr.
Barber's son as proof of the matter asserted i.e. that Mr. Barber
made his son steal the items. Therefore, the statement was hearsay
unless it fit within the definition of nonhearsay contained in Rule
801(d) Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). Rule 801 (d)(2)(D) provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay:
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is
(D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during
the existence of the relationship.
For the statement to be admissible as nonhearsay under the
agency definition set forth above, the State must establish that an
agency relationship existed and that the statement was made within
- 5 -

the scope and in furtherance of that relationship*
of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D).

See Utah Rules

Agency is defined as "...a fiduciary

relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject
to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Continental
Bank and Trust Co. v. Taylorf 384 P.2d 796 (Utah 1963) citing
American Law Institute Restatement of Agency 2d,§l.
Agency relationships typically arise in the context of
business relationships.

Utah Rule of Evidence §801(d)(2)(D)

specifically refers to employment situations, and case law
discussing agency issues generally arise in such contexts. See City
Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth/ 672 P2d 89(Utah 1983); see
also Continental Bank and Trust v. Taylor/ supra.

Generally/ where

a principal-agent relationship existsf the agent is authorized by
the principal to act as a substitute for the principal/ and to make
contracts and otherwise act on behalf of the principal.
Whether a child can act as an agent has not been addressed
by the Utah Supreme Court.

Mr. Barber contends that the concept of

agency law precludes a finding that an eight year old child was
legally capable of acting as an agent in the circumstances outlined
in this case.
Rule 801(d)(2)(E)/ Utah Rules of Evidence (1983)/ provides
for the admission of a statement by a co-conspirator as non
hearsay.

That section states:
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is
(E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
While the trial court based its decision on the agency rule

contained in 801(d)(2)(D)/ the Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged
- 6 -

that "(t)he co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule ...is
merely a rule of evidence founded to some extent on the concepts of
agency law." State v. Gray 717 P2d 1313, 1318 (Utah 1986)citing U.S.
v. Trowery 542 P2d 623f 626(3d Cir 1976)(Citations omitted) Cert den
429 U.S. 1104, 1977).

Hence, by analogy, the decisions under 801

(d)(2)(E) are applicable in determining the admissibility of
evidence under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).
In order to utilize the co-conspirator rule, the State must
introduce evidence "independent and exclusive of the conspirator's
hearsay statements themselves, showing the existence of a criminal
joint venture and the defendant's participation therein". State v.
Gray, supra at 1318. Allowing the State to prove an agency
relationship or conspiracy with the disputed hearsay would permit
"hearsay to lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of
competent evidence." _Id. at 1318 citing Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S.
60, 75 (1942).
In the present case, the evidence did not establish that an
agency relationship existed between Mr. Barber and his eight year
old son.

The State presented no evidence that an employment

situation existed between Mr. Barber and his son.

The State

presented no evidence that Mr. Barber authorized his eight year old
son to act on his behalf in a legal capacity.

While arguably the

statement allegedly made by the son suggests that he was acting
under the direction of his father, it does not suggest an agency
relationship in the legal sense. By analogy to the rule in
co-conspirator cases, the State must establish an agency
relationship by evidence independent of that statement; the State
- 7 -

produced no such independent evidence. Finally, Mr. Barber contends
that an eight year old cannot legally act as agent.

Because the

evidence did not show that an agency relationship existed between
Mr. Barber and his son, the trial court erred in ruling that the
statement was admissible as nonhearsaye
Assuming, arguendo, that the State proved by independent
and exclusive evidence that an agency relationship existed, the
statement allegedly made by the boy was made after the termination
of such relationship and was outside the scope of such relationship
and not in furtherance thereof, as required by Utah Rules of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D).
By analogy, case law discussing co-conspirator statements
provides some elucidation. It is well established that a statement
by a co-conspirator may only be used against another co-conspirator
if the statement was made while the plan was still in existence and
before its termination.
440 (1949).

See, Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.

In Krulewitch, the Supreme Court held that a statement

made by a co-conspirator after the conspiracy ended was not in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
A conspiracy is usually deemed to end when the substantive
crime that is the object of the conspiracy has been committed or
threatened.

State v. Darby, 599 P.2d 821 (Ari.App.1979), State v.

Caldero, 705 P.2d 85 (Idaho App. 1985). Courts have held that
statements made after arrest can no longer be introduced using the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
Lam Lek Chong, 544 F.2d 58 (2d.Cir. 1976).

See United States v.

The general rule is that

a declaration of a co-conspirator made without the approval of the
- 8 -

accused after the conspiracy has ended may only be used against the
declarant.

Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Evidence §643 (13th ed. 1973

and Supp 1986).
In the present case, even if an agency relationship had
existed, the boy's statement exceeded the scope of such relationship
and was made after the termination thereof.

Common sense suggests

that even if the boy were acting as an agent for the purpose of
taking items from the store, placing blame on his father was not
part of his role as such an agent and did not further the activity
of stealing items from the store.

The statement itself clarified

that had such a relationship existed, it was terminated. Assuming,
arguendo, that an agency relationship had existed between Mr. Barber
and his son, Mr. Hutchinson's apprehension of the boy ended any
agency relationship which may have existed.
Because an agency relationship did not exist between Mr.
Barber and his son or, alternatively, if one did exist, the
statement allegedly made by the boy was outside the scope of such
relationship and not in furtherance thereof, the statement was
inadmissible hearsay and the court erred in allowing the jury to
hear it.
Since the State presented very little evidence other than
the statement to establish that Mr. Barber was directing his son's
actions and due to the damaging nature of the statement, admitting
the statement constitutes reversible error.

- 9 -

POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
CONVICTION OF RETAIL THEFT
A jury convicted Mr. Barber of Retail Theft, a second
degree felony in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 602 (1),
(Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended) as charged in the Information.
See Addendum A.

He now argues that the state introduced

insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for Retail Theft and
requests reversal of the conviction.
To convict a defendant of Retail Theft, the state must
introduce evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the individual committed the crime charged.

This standard is

set forth in Utah Code Ann. §76-1-501 (1953 as amended):
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed
to be innocent until each element of the offense
charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In absence of such proof, a defendant
shall be acquitted.
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-602 (1953 as amended) sets
forth the elements required to prove that a defendant committed the
crime of retail theft.

That section provides:

76-6-602. Retail theft, acts constituting. A
person commits the offense of retail theft when
he knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away,
transfers or causes to be carried away or
transferred, any merchandise displayed, held
stored or offered for sale in a retail
merchantile establishment with the intention of
retaining such merchandise or with the intention
of depriving the merchant permanently of the
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise
without paying the retail value of such
merchandise;

- 10 -

The authority of the reviewing Court to reverse a judgment
on sufficiency of the evidence is clear*

The Utah Supreme Court

stated in State v, Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983):
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, [viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict] is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted,
(Citations omitted).
In State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975), the Supreme
Court also discussed a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
conviction, it must appear that viewing the
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably
be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable
to the verdict of the jury, reasonable minds
could not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In an earlier decision, State v. Williams, 180 P.2d 551,
555 (Utah 1947) the Court acknowledged that the total picture
presented by the record must be considered in reviewing an
insufficiency claim:
We are not unmindful of the settled rule that it
is the province of the jury to weigh the
testimony and determine the facts. Nevertheless,
we cannot escape the responsibility of passing
judgment upon whether under the evidence a jury
could, in reason, conclude that the defendant's
guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This
is not to say that merely by reason of the fact
that the circumstances surrounding an alleged
assault of this nature created a reasonable doubt
in the mind of this court that the offense was in
fact committed, we will set aside a verdict. The
total picture presented by the record here
considered must be kept in mind in evaluating the
result here reached.

- 11 -

Clearly then, each case must turn upon its own facts as to
whether a verdict must be overturned due to the insufficiency of the
evidence.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-202, (1953 as amended)
outlines the situation where an individual can be held criminally
responsible for the conduct of another.

That section provides:

Criminal responsibility for direct commission of
offense or for conduct of another.—Every person,
acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for such
conduct.
In the present case, Mr. Barber was connected to the crime
only through his presence at the scene, a statement which was
overheard by store personnel, and a statement made by his son.
There is no evidence that Mr. Barber solicited, requested,
commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided his sons in the
shoplifting.
Ms. Skollingsberg testified that she never lost sight of
Mr. Barber (R. 145). She did not testify that she saw Mr. Barber
take any merchandise from the store.

Ms. Skollingsberg was standing

close enough to Mr. Barber to hear him tell his older son that they
might have to seek help in finding the younger boy (R. 153) yet she
never offered any testimony that Mr. Barber encouraged his sons'
shoplifting.
Mrs. Hansen also was able to overhear part of Mr. Barber's
conversation with his sons but did not hear any conversations which
show that Mr. Barber encouraged his sons to steal anything.

- 12 -

Mrs. Hansen testified that she overheard Mr. Barber tell his son to
take what he had and to ditch it in the toy department (R. 169).
This testimony indicates that if Mr. Barber had any knowledge of his
son's shoplifting he was attempting to end it and have his son
return the merchandise he had taken.

This argument is strengthened

by the fact that Mr. Barber voluntarily sought out a salesman to
indicate that his son had stolen some video equipment and that he
would bring his son back to the department (R. 130, 132). This
testimony shows that when Mr. Barber became aware of his son's
activities, he did everything he could to make sure the merchandise
was returned to the store.
Mr. Hutchinson testified that when he asked by Mr. Barber's
eight year old son to accompany him back to the store the boy said,
"I didn't want to do this.

My Dad made me do this" (R. 201). This

is the most damaging testimony offered by the prosecution to
establish guilt on the part of Mr. Barber.

As previously outlined,

Mr. Barber contends that the statement was inadmissible hearsay.
Assuming the statement was admissible, it seems little more than an
attempt by a young boy to escape blame for something he did.

There

is no corroborating evidence that proves that the Mr. Barber's
actions amounted to criminal responsibility on his part.
The state presented no evidence that Mr. Barber knowingly
took any of the store merchandise with the intention of permanently
depriving the store of its use or possession.

Mr. Barber was seen

holding two plastic shopping bags but the only merchandise any of
the store personnel actually saw in his possession was the Cabbage
Patch Doll (R. 131-132).

- 13 -

Tne evidence in this case was so inconclusive that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
Mr. Barber knew about the planned shoplifting before it occurred and
intentionally aided the boys in removing items from the store.
Because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Barber committed the crime of retail theft, the
conviction must be reversed.

POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE VALUE
OF THE ITEMS TAKEN EXCEEDED ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (1953, as amended) classifies
theft offenses according to the value of the items taken.
section provides in pertinent part:

76-6-412. Theft—Classification of
offenses—(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be punishable as
follows:
(a) As a felony of the second degree if:
(i) The value of the property or services
exceeds $1,0000; or
(b) As a felony of the third degree if:
(i) The value of the property or services is
more than $250 but not more than $1,000; or
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen was more than $100 but does not
exceed $250.
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen was $100 or less.

- 14 -

That

As outlined in Point II, Mr. Barber contends that there was
insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
involved in a theft of any merchandise.

Assuming, arguendo, that

the evidence supported a conviction for theft, Mr. Barber contends
that the theft should have been classified as a Class B Misdemeanor,
in violation of 76-6-412 (d) since the State failed to produce
evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
value of items taken exceeded one hundred dollars.
For an individual to be convicted of theft, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual intended to
permanently deprive another of the items in questions.
Davis, 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984).

See State v.

Once the State has established that

a theft occurred, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
value of any items taken.

See §76-6-412,Utah Code Ann. (1953, as

amended).
In this case, the State did not produce sufficient evidence
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Barber intended to
permanently deprive the store of the possession, use or benefit of
the recorder.

At best, the activity amounted to an attempted theft

of the recorder and therefore the value of the recorder cannot be
considered in classifying the offense.
Attempt is defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101. That
section provides in pertinent part:
76-4-101. Attempt—Elements of offense.—(1)
For purposes of this part a person is guilty of
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the
kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward commission
of the offense.
- 15 -

(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does
not constitute a substantial step unless it is
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to
commit the offense.
In People v. Falgares, 328 N.E.2d 210 (111 App. 1975) the
court held that placing articles in a brown paper bag and moving to
another part of the store did not complete the final act required
for theft but showed only attempted theft.
Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Barber is linked to the
removal of the recorder from the video department pursuant to the
state's theory of the case, there nevertheless is no evidence
showing that Mr. Barber intended to permanently deprive the store of
the recorder.

The salesman in the video department conversed with

Mr. Barber, but the recorder was already gone from the department
(R. 172). Mr. Barber informed the salesman that he believed
something was missing from the department at that time (R. 171).
Mr. Barber told the salesman that his son had a problem with
stealing and that he would try to find the boy and bring him back to
the department (R. 171). Prior to this conversation, the salesman
had not realized anything was missing from the department (R. 179).
Mr. Barber was apprehended as he left the store looking for
his son (R. 136-137).

The video recorder was still in the store

when he was stopped (R. 139). The evidence shows that he was
leaving the store when apprehended and therefore had no intent to
permanently deprive the store of the merchandise.

Even accepting

the State's theory of the case, the actions amounted to no more than
an attempted theft and therefore, the value of the recorder cannot
be considered in classifying the theft offense.
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Utah Code Ann. §76-6-601 (1953, as amended) defines retail
value as "the merchant's stated or advertised price of the
merchandise."

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the value

of property taken is the market value.

State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811

(Utah 1977).
Since the evidence was insufficient to establish a theft of
the recorder, the only items that could be considered in classifying
the level of the theft are the Cabbage Patch Doll and the video
camera.

The State failed to present any evidence as to the value of

the camera alone.

Mr. Bailey testified that it was impossible to

determine the retail value of the video camera without the video
recorder (R. 181). Absent such evidence, the state failed to prove
the value of the camera beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore the
camera cannot be considered in classifying the level of theft
pursuant to §76-6-412, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
Assuming for the purposes of argument that Mr. Barber was
criminally responsible for the theft of the Cabbage Patch Doll, the
value of that item is the only value to be considered in determining
the classification of the theft.

Ms. Skollingsberg testified that

the Cabbage Patch Doll had a retail value of thirty six dollars (R.
137).

Based on this testimony, and assuming this Court finds there

was sufficient evidence to hold Mr. Barber criminally liable for the
actions of his sons, Mr. Barber should have been sentenced under
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 (d) for Retail Theft, a Class B Misdemeanor.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, Anthony
Barber requests this Court to reverse his conviction for Retail
Theft, a second degree felony, and remand this case to the trial
court for dismissal, a new trial or an order that the conviction for
this case be for theft, a Class B Misdemeanor *
Respectfully submitted this

j\

tmx.

day of March, 1987.
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LISA J. RE/AL
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, LISA J. REMAL, hereby certify that four copies of the
foregoing brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
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ADDENDUM A

T.L. "TED" CANNON
County Attorney
By: DAVID S. WALSH
Deputy County Attorney
Courtsids Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

F% -M

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

)

Screened by:
Assigned to:
BAIL

v.

D S Walsh
D S Walsh

$5,000.00

)
TMCADMA TTAM

ANTHOXY G. BARBER DOB 11/27/5 3,

)

Criminal No.

Defendant(s).

'

)

fQ KfTC*

dor a

'2803

The undersigned Monte Kartchner - SO under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
RETAIL THEFT, a Second Degree Felony, at 4855 South Highland Drive,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about November 23,
1985, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 602(1),
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as awended, in that the defendant,
ANTHONY G. BARBER, a party to the offense, did take
possession of, conceal, carry away, transfer or cause to be
carried away or transferred, merchandise displayed, held,
stored,
or
offered
for
sale
in a retail
mercantile
establishment, to-wit: ZCMI, such merchandise consisting of
video camera, Cabbage Patch Kid, and that said defendant did
so with the intention o£ retaining such merchandise or with
the intent to permanently deprive said merchant of the
possession, use • or benefit of such merchandise, without
paying
the
retail
value
of such merchandise, to-wit:
$1,900,00;
(Continued on page Two)

INFORMATION
STATE v. ANTHONY G. BARBER
County Attorney #85-1-68128
Page Two
THIS INFORMATION
WITNESSES:

IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED

Monte D Kartchner
Kathy Skollingsberg
Judith A. Hansen

Lloyd Prescott
David R Bailey

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Affiant, a deputy with the
following persons and states:

FROM THE FOLLOWING

Milan Buehler
Stephen F Hutchinson

Sheriff's

Office

has

spoken

to

the

1) On November 23, 1985, Kathy Skollingberg, a security guard with
ZCMI followed defendant his 2 sons, age 8 and 10, around ZCMI. She
noticed defendant place a cabbage patch kid in a ZCMI sack.
2) Judith Hansen overheard the defendant tell his one son to hide
what he had in his sack in th toy departmento
3)
During the
Ivolfes sack.

course

of the

stolking, defendant

was

handling

a

4) Upon being questioned, defendant gave permission to affiant, for
him to search defendant's car. In the car was found the Wolfes sack
which contained a video camera.
5)

The value of the property taken exceeded $1,900.00

Affiant

, ..'.,.".

Sjubs-e-rdbed; anxT ^sworn to before m
this ~zv ..dayjWf) December, 1985.

V6u>
Judge '
Authorized Cor presentment and
filing:
^
y
I

:^UM'r:u^'

T.L. ."TED" CANNON, County,-Attorney
J

/

L

^
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-;—Deputy

